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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relation between executive compensation incentives and the nature of 
merger transactions inside and outside of merger waves. We find that the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to firm risk, vega, increases the likelihood of merger transactions outside of waves, but is 
unrelated to merger frequency inside wave periods. CEOs whose compensation is more closely 
tied to firm risk make better performing acquisitions when they acquire outside of merger waves, 
but this is not the case for in-wave deals, suggesting that underperformance of acquiring firms 
during waves can be attributed in part to ineffective compensation incentives. We also find that 
the cross-sectional dispersion of acquirers’ returns is higher for in-wave acquisitions relative to 
acquisitions made outside a wave, suggesting that out-wave acquisitions are characterized by 
lower uncertainty of future stock price returns. This is again restricted to high vega CEOs during 
out-wave periods.  
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1. Introduction 
Merger activity historically clusters in ‘waves’ across time and industries, and waves are of 
significant magnitude in economic terms (Moeller et al., 2005). For the general population of 
mergers with deal value greater than $1million in Compustat we identify 58 merger waves, with 
an average of 225 acquisitions per wave, between 1991 and 2010. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) 
propose that waves are driven by shocks to the cost and revenue structure of industries, such as 
changes in technology and government regulations whereas Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue 
that waves are driven by relative mis-valuation of acquiring and target firms. Acquiring firms 
have also been shown to significantly underperform for several years following mergers during a 
wave period (Moeller et al., 2005; Bouwman et al., 2009). 
In this study we extend research on agency cost theories that seek to explain differences 
in the quality of merger decisions inside and outside of merger waves. For a sample of 7,689 
mergers initiated by publicly traded firms between 1993 and 2010, we examine how merger 
waves affect the relation between ex-ante CEO remuneration incentives and both the likelihood 
of firms engaging in merger activity and the quality of these decisions. We propose that 
differences in compensation incentives affecting the relation between CEO wealth and both 
stockholder wealth (delta) and risk (vega) are an important channel through which merger 
decisions vary inside and outside of merger waves.  
Following Duchin and Schmidt (2013), we expect that acquiring firm managers can more 
easily ‘get away’ with bad merger decisions during waves. This can arise due to higher adverse 
selection costs that reduce the ability of analysts and investors to identify low quality targets, 
weak corporate governance at acquiring firms, and the resulting difficulty in monitoring the 
actions of acquiring firm CEOs. We therefore expect that during wave periods there is no 
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relation between incentive compensation and propensity to acquire. In contrast, when monitoring 
is stronger during out-wave periods, highly incentivized managers should acquire only when it is 
optimal to do so for firm stockholders and CEOs will respond positively to compensation 
incentives that reward managers for taking on risky investment projects (Coles et al., 2006).  
Our results show that compensation incentives for acquiring firm CEOs are weaker 
during merger waves. Cash compensation is higher and pay-risk sensitivity is lower for acquiring 
firm managers during in-wave periods relative to out-wave periods. Moreover, we find a positive 
relation between vega and the likelihood of making an acquisition outside of merger waves only. 
Since acquisitions are a risky class of investment, this is in line with the expectations that higher 
pay-risk sensitivity reduces managerial risk aversion, mitigating agency costs (Coles et al., 2006; 
Billett et al., 2010). Conversely, CEO compensation incentives are unrelated to acquisition 
activity during merger waves. These results indicate that the decision to acquire during merger 
waves is unrelated to compensation incentives, suggesting sub-optimal compensation design.  
Our study also re-examines the documented underperformance of acquisitions initiated 
during merger waves relative to out-wave deals (e.g. Moeller et al., 2005). If in-wave 
acquisitions consistently destroy value for acquiring firm stockholders, they should not be among 
the investment choices of CEOs whose interests are sufficiently aligned to those of stockholders. 
Therefore, superior performance of out-wave deals is likely to be explained by stronger 
compensation incentives provided to acquiring managers outside of merger waves. 
We find that the documented underperformance of acquisitions initiated during merger 
waves can be explained, in part, by weak compensation incentives. While vega is positively 
related to short- and long-term stock price returns for out-wave acquisitions, no such relation is 
found for mergers initiated during a wave. We expect that ex-ante compensation incentives are 
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ineffective during in-wave periods given reduced monitoring and the ex-post increase in CEO 
compensation following even low quality mergers (Goel and Thakor, 2010; Fu et al., 2013). 
Finally, we examine the standard deviation of post-acquisition abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms as a direct test of how adverse selection costs vary conditional on merger waves. 
During periods of high adverse selection costs, we expect higher dispersion of post-acquisition 
returns as new information is released to the market, over time, on the underlying quality of 
acquiring and target firms (Yung et al., 2008). We propose that compensation incentives lead 
managers to perform greater due diligence on target firms, which leads to lower dispersion in 
post-acquisition abnormal returns. However, we expect that compensation incentives are 
effective only outside of merger waves. During in-wave periods, firm managers who make low 
quality acquisitions can more easily pool within a greater number of acquiring firms and ‘get 
away’ with low quality merger decisions (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013). 
Our results show that in-wave acquisitions are subject to greater adverse selection costs. 
Firms engaging in merger activity during in-wave periods experience a higher dispersion of 
abnormal returns in the post-acquisition period relative to firms acquiring outside of merger 
waves. Moreover, during out-wave periods high vega CEOs make acquisition decisions that are 
characterized by greater certainty of post-acquisition returns. This supports our proposition that 
CEO compensation during out-wave periods incentivizes acquiring firm CEOs to conduct greater 
due diligence of target firms. In contrast, the compensation incentives of in-wave acquiring 
CEOs are ineffective in mitigating such concerns and we observe no difference in the dispersion 
of post-acquisition returns between high and low incentive compensation CEOs. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. We extend the findings of 
Duchin and Schmidt (2013) who show that adverse selection costs and inefficient monitoring of 
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firm management can explain the underperformance of acquiring firms during merger waves. 
We show, in part, this is driven by weaker compensation incentives provided to acquiring firm 
CEOs. Outside of merger waves managers respond to pay-risk compensation incentives by 
making more acquisitions, better performing acquisitions, and have greater consistency in post-
acquisition performance. During merger waves, compensation incentives are unrelated to deal 
performance and propensity to acquire, given weaker corporate governance, higher adverse 
selection costs, and expected increases in ex-post CEO compensation (Fu et al., 2013). 
Our results also have implications for the optimal design of CEO compensation contracts, 
highlighting the need to consider external market conditions, as well as the firm’s investment 
opportunity set in the design of managerial incentives. We show that the importance of providing 
managers with risk-seeking compensation incentives (see Datta et al., 2001; Coles et al., 2006) is 
contingent on the level of takeover market activity. We show that outside of merger waves, CEO 
risk-taking incentives increase the likelihood of managers undertaking mergers and the 
performance of acquiring firms, whereas such incentives are redundant during merger waves. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys literature on merger 
waves, executive compensation and merger performance, and develops our empirical 
hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the construction of the sample and the identification of merger 
waves. Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1.The determinants of merger waves and acquiring firm long-run performance 
Evidence on the drivers of merger waves and the underperformance of acquiring firms during 
wave periods is mixed (Rau and Stouraitis, 2011). Lambrecht (2004) argues that firms tend to 
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merge in periods of economic expansion and Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) find that merger 
activity is positively related to uncertainty surrounding future cash flows. The two theories that 
find the strongest support in the literature explain merger waves on the basis of stock market 
mis-valuation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanatham, 2004) and industry 
shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005).  
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that takeover waves are caused by industry-wide 
phenomena, or industry shocks, rather than due to target-specific characteristics. Andrade et al. 
(2001) find that mergers occur in waves and cluster by industry, which is supportive of the 
theory that mergers occur as a reaction to unexpected industry shocks. Harford (2005) argues 
that industry merger waves are caused by economic, regulatory and technological shocks under 
the condition that sufficient capital liquidity is available to accommodate the transactions. 
Mergers can also occur in waves following deregulation of poorly performing industries 
(Ovtchinnikov, 2013). 
Alternatively, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) attribute merger clustering to stock market mis-
valuation, arguing that firms with overvalued equity are more likely to become acquirers while 
undervalued and relatively less overvalued firms are more likely to become takeover targets. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also show that merger waves are more likely to occur 
during periods of stock market overvaluation. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) provide empirical 
evidence to support these earlier propositions. 
In addition to examining the determinants of merger waves, prior research also examines 
differences in acquiring firm performance in the short- and long-term. The evidence on short-run 
acquiring firm performance inside and outside of merger waves is, at best, mixed. Moeller et al. 
(2005) find higher short-term returns to acquiring firms during the merger wave between 1998 
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and 2001. Ovtchinnikov (2013) finds that bidders’ announcement returns are actually lower 
during merger waves that follow industry deregulation relative to mergers in unregulated 
industries, which do not usually occur during wave periods. Duchin and Schmidt (2013) find no 
difference in short-term announcement returns between in-wave and out-wave acquiring firms. 
Examining the largest merger wave in U.S. history, between 1998 and 2001, Moeller et 
al. (2005) document significant long-run underperformance for acquiring-firm stockholders, 
which is driven by a small number of acquisitions made by high valuation bidders. In contrast, 
mergers earlier in the 1990s are found to increase value for the acquiring firm. Bouwman et al. 
(2009) find that acquirers in hot markets experience significantly lower long-term abnormal 
stock returns and operating performance than acquirers in depressed markets. These findings are 
consistent with recent evidence that corporate decisions are affected by stock market valuations 
and the authors attribute their results to managerial herding that leads to lower quality investment 
decisions during wave periods. Goel and Thakor (2010) find that acquirers’ underperformance is 
concentrated in mergers initiated later in the wave. Duchin and Schmidt (2013) find significant 
long–term underperformance for acquisitions initiated during merger waves. They attribute this 
to higher adverse selection costs in identification of low quality targets, which leads to weaker 
monitoring and higher agency costs at acquiring firms during wave periods. If managers are 
likely to mimic the investment decisions of other managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), they 
argue that in-wave deals are agency-driven. They show that, during merger waves managers can 
‘get away’ with bad acquisitions because they are evaluated more favorably when they make 
decisions similar to those of their peers. The reduced monitoring and increased uncertainty 
during merger waves makes it easier for managers to share the blame of unsuccessful 
acquisitions with other managers.  
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2.2.Executive compensation and mergers  
Prior research shows that mergers lead to an increase in the level of managerial compensation 
subsequent to completion of the deal. Since CEO compensation increases after an acquisition 
even if the transaction destroys value for acquiring firm stockholders, executives may engage in 
merger activity to increase the size of their firms and their level of compensation (Bliss and 
Rosen, 2001; Sharma and Hsieh, 2011). The post-acquisition increase in executive compensation 
is often unrelated to deal performance (Kroll et al., 1990; Bliss and Rosen, 2001), is likely to be 
driven in part by CEO envy of their peer group (Goel and Thakor, 2010), and can take the form 
of either higher cash compensation (Schmidt and Fowler, 1990) or greater stock and option 
grants (Harford and Li, 2007). Fu et al. (2013) find that mergers driven by bidding firm 
overvaluation, which can itself be a cause of waves, lead to significant increases in awards of 
new restricted stock and option grants despite poor post-acquisition performance. 
The ex-ante structure of executive compensation contracts can also play an important role 
in managers’ decision to acquire.  Being risky investment decisions, compensation incentives 
linked to stockholder wealth and risk are expected to increase the incentive for risk-averse CEOs 
to initiate mergers. Specifically, higher pay-risk sensitivity, vega, is expected to mitigate risk 
aversion, increasing the propensity to acquire (Croci and Petmezas, 2015). Sharma and Hsieh 
(2011) argue that acquiring managers receive higher proportions of equity-based compensation 
and lower proportions of cash compensation than the managers of non-acquiring firms. 
In addition to an increased propensity to acquire, incentive compensation can also 
improve the quality of managerial decisions. Mehran (1995) finds that firms whose managers 
receive higher proportions of equity-related compensation have higher Tobin’s Q. Datta et al. 
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(2001) and Minnick et al. (2011) find that incentive compensation makes managers less risk-
averse when they acquire, which leads to better-performing merger decisions.  
 
2.3.Hypotheses development 
Duchin and Schmidt (2013) show that long-run acquiring firm underperformance during wave 
periods is driven, in part, by reducing monitoring of firm management. We extend this finding 
and provide new evidence on how ex-ante incentives provided through managerial compensation 
contracts affect the likelihood of undertaking acquisitions inside and outside of merger waves 
and the quality of these acquisitions. In doing so, we consider whether the documented superior 
performance of out-wave acquisitions is related to the incentives acquiring firm managers are 
provided with via their compensation contracts. 
We expect a positive relation between incentive compensation and the propensity to 
engage in risk investment decisions, including mergers (Datta et al., 2001; Croci and Petmezas, 
2015). We propose that this relation will differ conditional on merger waves. Outside of wave 
periods, we expect that risk-averse acquiring firm managers respond to greater compensation 
incentives in the manner proposed by Smith and Stulz (1985) and Edmans and Gabaix (2011). 
Subsequently, we expect that the propensity to acquire outside of merger waves is positively 
related to managers’ incentive compensation. 
During wave periods merger decisions can arise from managerial herding, which 
increases information asymmetry and reduces the ability of monitors to differentiate between 
poor post-acquisition performance caused by bad managerial decision making or general market 
trends (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013). Given this environment, the ability to pool within a larger 
group of acquiring managers reduces the inherent risk aversion of acquiring firm managers 
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because they are less likely to be held accountable for any low quality merger decisions (Ross, 
2004; Duchin and Schmidt, 2013). Managers motivated by the increased ex-post compensation 
benefits from mergers will be more willing to engage in merger transactions during wave 
periods. Therefore, during wave periods managers are less likely to require ex-ante compensation 
incentives to engage in risky merger transactions. We therefore expect no relation between 
compensation incentives and the propensity to acquire during merger waves. 
Should these predictions be correct, we expect to reject the following null hypothesis: 
 
H1: The difference in the likelihood of acquiring a firm between in-wave and out-wave 
time periods is unrelated to incentive compensation. 
 
Prior studies shows that firm performance is positively associated with equity-based 
compensation (Mehran, 1995) but negatively with excessive cash compensation (Brick et al., 
2006). Moreover, incentive compensation is associated with value-increasing acquisitions (Datta 
et al., 2001; Minnick et al., 2011). At the same time, mergers initiated during wave time periods 
significantly underperform their benchmark index in the long-term (Bouwman et al., 2009; Goel 
and Thakor, 2010), while evidence on short-term returns for in-wave and out-wave transactions 
is mixed (Moeller et al., 2005; Ovtchinnikov, 2013).  
We propose here that the previously documented relation between managers’ 
compensation incentives and post-acquisition performance will vary inside and outside of merger 
waves. Given the reduced monitoring during merger waves proposed by Duchin and Schmidt 
(2013), managers are more likely to engage in low quality acquisitions that are associated with 
subsequent underperformance. Given this environment, we expect that equity based 
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compensation is ineffective in encouraging managers to undertake value maximizing investment 
decisions and therefore we expect no relation between incentive compensation and acquiring 
firm performance during wave periods. We expect the previously documented positive relation 
between incentive compensation and deal performance to be restricted to out-wave time periods 
where incentive compensation can be used to overcome managerial risk aversion and reward 
managers for making value maximizing decisions. 
To measure merger performance, we examine the immediate stock price response to 
merger announcements, and long-run stock price and operating performance following the 
transaction. Performance measures surrounding in-wave and out-wave mergers are compared to 
verify prior evidence on differences in deal performance across in-wave and out-wave time 
periods. Should the empirical findings confirm that differences in performance between in-wave 
and out-wave deals can be explained by managerial incentives, the following null hypothesis will 
be rejected: 
 
H2: The difference in short- and long-term acquiring firm performance between in-wave 
and out-wave time periods is unrelated to incentive compensation. 
 
Finally, we expect that acquisitions initiated during merger waves are subject to greater 
information asymmetry and adverse selection concerns for acquiring firm stockholders relative 
to out-wave acquisitions. In the context of IPOs, Yung et al. (2008) propose that this valuation 
uncertainty is resolved over time as private information on firm quality is released to the market. 
Applying this theory to merger transactions, we expect higher cross-sectional variation of post-
acquisition stock price returns for in-wave relative to out-wave mergers.  
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We also extend this analysis to examine the relation between CEO incentive 
compensation and the cross-sectional variation of post-acquisition stock price returns. We 
propose that better incentivized managers will have a greater incentive to overcome adverse 
selection concerns by performing sufficient due diligence of target firms. Incentive compensation 
is expected to be more effective in encouraging effective due diligence during out-wave time 
periods because acquisitions are less concentrated in short periods of time, giving mangers more 
time to carry out this activity. Outside of merger waves, a higher level of incentive compensation 
is expected to be more effective in mitigating adverse selection costs, leading managers to make 
fewer low quality acquisitions. We expect that during wave periods, the increased managerial 
euphoria, ex-post increases in compensation following completed deals, reduced monitoring and 
weaker corporate governance will moderate the positive relation between incentive 
compensation and merger quality (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013; Fu et al., 2013).  
Following this, we propose the following null hypothesis: 
 
H3: The dispersion of cross-sectional post-acquisition abnormal returns between in-wave 
and out-wave time periods is unrelated to incentive compensation. 
 
3. Sample data 
3.1.Sample construction 
We use three primary data samples to conduct empirical analysis and construct merger 
and executive compensation variables. For our matched sample the SDC Platinum database is 
used to collect all completed domestic1 mergers and acquisitions between January 1, 1993 and 
December 31, 2010. Both the announcement and effective day should be within our sample 
                                                          
1 Both the bidder and the target are US firms. 
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period. We follow Aktas et al. (2013) and select only those transactions that have been classified 
as mergers, acquisitions, acquisitions of majority interest, acquisitions of assets, acquisitions of 
certain assets, acquisitions of remaining interest, and exchange offers. In order to be included in 
the sample, the transactions should also fulfil the following criteria: the disclosed deal value 
should be at least $1 million2 and the bidding firm3 should be a publicly listed company owning 
less than 50 percent of the target firm’s stock six months prior to the acquisition announcement 
and holding at least 50 percent of the target’s stock after the transaction, such that an explicit 
change of control can be ensured. The number of transactions that meet these criteria is 28,751. 
We match our sample of mergers to CEO compensation data from ExecuComp for the year 
preceding the merger. The starting year of our merger sample is 1993 since ExecuComp does not 
provide executive compensation data prior to 1992. We require acquiring firms to have sufficient 
stock price data available in CRSP for the calculation of announcement returns and accounting 
data available in Compustat at the time of the acquisition announcement. These criteria results in 
a sample of 7,859 transactions made by 1,926 firms with available accounting, stock price and 
executive compensation data. From this sample, we drop a small number of transactions for 
acquiring firms where we cannot clearly identify the CEO of the company in Execucomp. This 
filter results in a final sample of 7,689 transactions made by 1,843 firms. 
To avoid selection bias in our findings from examining only completed acquisitions, we 
also construct an ExecuComp sample to examine the relation between incentive compensation 
and the likelihood of a firm making an acquisition. We collect all ExecuComp firms with 
available CEO compensation data for the period 1992-2009. This produces a sample of 30,995 
                                                          
2 SDC Platinum does not report method of payment for those transactions without a disclosed deal value. All dollar 
values in the analysis are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index and expressed in 2010 USD. 
3 Since all transactions in our sample are completed acquisitions, the terms acquirer and bidder or acquiring and 
bidding firm are used interchangeably.  
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firm-year observations for 2,430 unique firms with CEO compensation data available. We then 
match firm-year observations in ExecuComp with data on merger transactions made by each 
firm during each year of our sample period from SDC Platinum. For the larger ExecuComp 
sample we have the same sample of 7,689 transactions made by 1,843 firms.  
Lastly, we construct a merger wave sample following the process of Duchin and Schmidt 
(2013) in order to classify merger transactions in the matched and ExecuComp samples as 
occurring during in-wave or out-wave time periods. We collect merger data for an extended 
sample of 35,829 completed US mergers and acquisitions with an announcement and effective 
date within the period January 1, 1981 to December 31, 2010 using SDC Platinum and using the 
Aktas et al. (2013) sample selection criteria described previously. In the merger wave sample we 
do not require data availability in ExecuComp and CRSP/Compustat. The sample is extended 
back to 1981 to avoid bias in the identification of merger wave patterns due to the unusually high 
merger activity in the US in the 1990s relative to preceding and subsequent periods. 5,394 (15%) 
of these 35,829 transactions occurred in 1981-1990, 18,645 (52%) occurred in 1991-2000 and 
11,790 (33%) occurred in 2001-2010. This pattern is comparable to the distribution of mergers 
documented by Duchin and Schmidt (2013).4  
 
3.2.Identification of merger waves 
Since mergers are found to cluster by industry (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade et al., 
2001) we follow Harford (2005) to identify merger waves that occurred in the 48 industry groups 
                                                          
4 Duchin and Schmidt (2013) report a final sample of 9,854 acquisitions of which 1,677 (17%) occurred in the first 
decade of their sample (1980-1989), 4,869 (49%) occurred in the second decade (1990-1999) and 3,308 (34%) 
occurred in the third decade (2000-2009). The smaller size of their sample is due to more restrictions imposed in 
their selection criteria. Duchin and Schmidt select only those transactions identified by SDC as mergers, transactions 
with a reported deal value of at least $10 million, and that represent at least 5% of the market value of the bidding 
firm at the time of the announcement. The remaining sample selection criteria are identical to our own. 
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classified by Fama and French (1997). Ahern and Harford (2014) show that apart from occurring 
within industries, merger waves also propagate across industries through customer-supplier links. 
In particular, they find that cross-industry merger activity is more intense when product market 
connections are stronger and shocks travel across the economy through supplier links. Therefore, 
in the methodology followed in this section, both intra- and inter-industry deals are taken into 
consideration to characterize a transaction as in-wave or out-wave. Similar to Harford (2005), if 
both the acquirer and the target are from the same industry the transaction is counted only once towards 
the merger total for this industry. If the firms are from different industries, the transaction will count 
towards merger activity both for the industry of the bidder and the target.   
Following Harford (2005) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) we split the merger wave 
sample into three decades: 1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010. For each industry, we identify 
the 24-month period with the highest number of bids in each decade. These periods are classified 
as potential waves. We define an actual wave where the concentration of bids in the 24-month 
period is higher than the 95% percentile of the distribution of a simulated uniform distribution of 
all mergers that took place in that industry over the decade. Therefore, there can be up to one 
wave per industry-decade. Following Duchin and Schmidt (2013) potential waves consisting of 
fewer than 10 transactions are not considered as actual waves.  
Following the identification of merger waves, transactions are classified as in-wave or 
out-wave following the method developed by Harford (2005). For the merged sample of 
acquisitions we define In-Wave as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer or 
the target firm’s industry is experiencing a merger wave at the point where the acquisition is 
announced. For the ExecuComp sample that examines the propensity of firms to acquire we 
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define In-Wave_Year as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm operates in an 
industry that experiences a merger wave during the calendar year, and zero otherwise.5  
 
3.3.Merger waves descriptive statistics 
The method outlined in the previous section identifies 74 waves across 40 industries, which are 
presented in Table 1. 40 industries are identified with at least one wave, 23 industries with waves 
in at least two decades and 11 industries with waves in all three decades.6,7 For each wave, Table 
1 reports the month that the 24-month wave period started and the number of mergers during the 
wave. The largest wave identified is in the business services industry, began in September 1998 
and includes 1,491 completed deals. Harford (2005) identifies a similar wave for this industry at 
the same starting point. In general, most of the starting points identified in the merger wave 
sample differ to those reported by Harford (2005) only by a few months. For the merged sample 
of 7,689 acquisitions, 2,437 transactions (32% of the sample) are characterized as in-wave deals 
and the remaining 5,252 (68%) transactions are classified as out-wave transactions. These 
proportions are identical to those reported in Duchin and Schmidt (2013) who also follow the wave 
identification strategy of Harford (2005). This shows that, despite the large size of firms covered in 
ExecuComp, sample firms engage in merger activity at a rate comparable to the general population of 
firms during in-wave and out-wave time periods. 
 
                                                          
5 Note that In-Wave is a transaction variable where conditional on a merger taking place, the transaction is classified 
as occurring inside or outside of a wave period if either of the bidding and target firm operate in an industry 
experiencing a wave. In-Wave_Year is a firm-year variable and classifies ExecuComp firms according to whether 
their industry is experiencing a wave during their financial year.   
6 The Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Products industries do not have 10 or more acquisitions in any 24-month 
period and the remaining six industries without a merger wave fail to fulfil the wave identification criteria following 
our simulation tests. 
7 This is comparable to the findings of Duchin and Schmidt (2013) who report 77 merger waves in their sample 
period with 38 industries having at least one wave, 28 industries having two waves or more and 11 industries having 
waves in all three decades. 
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3.4.Variable definitions and summary statistics for the merged sample 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for all compensation and control variables used in the analysis 
for the merged sample. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
3.4.1. CEO compensation 
CEO compensation (Total_Comp_CEO) is the sum of salary, bonus, the fair value of new stock 
and option grants and other components of executive pay.8 Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et 
al. (2006) argue that simplified measures equity-based pay used in early studies are only noisy 
proxies for managerial incentives that are captured by the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to 
stock price changes, delta, and stock return volatility, vega. They show that delta and vega can 
better explain the compensation characteristics that theoretical models identify as important.  
The calculation of Delta_CEO and Vega_CEO for our sample follows the method 
developed by Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006).9 The mean (median) delta value is 
$1,524,000 ($222,000), and the mean (median) value of vega is $171,000 ($44,000). The values 
of compensation variables are generally higher than Cohen et al. (2013) and Croci and Petmezas 
(2015), which most likely reflects the expected positive relation between managerial incentives 
and corporate investment documented in these studies. 
 
3.4.2. Post-acquisition performance  
Three measures of acquiring firm performance are examined. CARs(0,1) measure the short-term 
market reaction to acquisition announcements and is equal to the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal 
                                                          
8 These may include severance payments, imputed interest, tax reimbursements, perquisites and other personal 
payments, contributions to pension plans, life insurance premiums, payment for unused vacation, etc. 
9 We are grateful to Coles et al., (2006) for making their data on delta and vega publicly available. The data provides 
estimated values of vega and delta for each executive who appears in the ExecuComp database for the period 1992-
2010. 
17 
 
return over a two-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement date, where 0 is the 
day of the announcement, using the market model. Market model returns are calculated using the 
CRSP value-weighted index. The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the 
acquisition announcement. Moreover, in order to maintain independence of observations, when a 
company has made more than one acquisition announcement at the same date only the 
transaction with the highest deal value is included in the analysis. We also exclude outliers at the 
1% and 99% percentiles of the CARs(0,1) distribution.  
3yABHR measures acquirer’s 3-year post-acquisition stock price performance. It is 
calculated as the 3-year daily buy-and-hold return of the acquiring firm beginning one day 
following the acquisition effective date minus the 3-year daily buy-and-hold return of the 
matched firm over the same period.10 All companies with available stock price and accounting 
data in the CRSP/Compustat database are used as potential matches. Our matched criteria are as 
follows: the acquiring and matched firms should operate in the same industry;11 the matched firm 
should have not been involved in any acquisition activity either as acquirer or target for a period 
of 3 years preceding the acquisition effective date to 3 years following the acquisition effective 
date; the sum of the absolute difference of the market capitalization value and book-to-market 
ratio between the acquiring and the matched firm should be minimised. Each acquiring firm is 
matched to a firm from the pool of the potential matches that best meet these criteria. Matched 
firms that are delisted before the completion of the 3-year post-acquisition period are substituted 
with the next closest match on the day of the delisting.12 Similar to the approach followed for the 
                                                          
10 One year is defined as 252 trading days. 
11 Industries are again defined using the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification. 
12 30 acquirers of our final sample of 7,689 deals do not have available data on market capitalization and book-to-
market value in the year end before the announcement and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 747 out of the 
remaining 7,659 transactions are matched with two firms as the first matched firm is delisted before the passage of 
three years from the acquisition effective date. 81 acquirers are matched with three firms and 14 acquirers are 
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calculation of announcement returns, we exclude overlapping observations and outliers at the 1% 
and 99% percentiles of the 3yABHR distribution. 
ΔIROA measures the change in bidder’s operating performance over a 3-year period 
surrounding the acquisition effective date. It is defined as the ratio of acquirer’s return on assets 
(ROA) at the end of the second year following the year of the transaction (t+2) to the acquirer’s 
ROA at the end of the year preceding the year of the transaction (t-1). ROA is defined as 
operating income before depreciation divided by book value of total assets. Similar to our stock-
price performance measures, overlapping observations and outliers at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles of the distribution are excluded from the analysis without any effect on the results.13 
 
3.4.3. Control variables 
In subsequent analysis we control for a number of factors that have been identified by previous 
studies as important determinants of the decision to merger and merging firm’s post-acquisition 
financial and operating performance. As with compensation variables, firm characteristics are 
measured at the financial year-end prior to the acquisition announcement, unless otherwise 
specified.  
Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the acquiring firm’s market value 4 weeks 
before the announcement date. Moeller et al. (2004) find a negative relation between the size of 
the acquiring firm and announcement period returns and Gorton et al., (2009) show that merger 
waves are more likely to occur in industries with more medium-size firms. We define 
Relative_Size as the ratio of the deal value reported in SDC Platinum to the market value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
matched with four firms that best meet the matching criteria. In 5 cases where no match is possible after the delisting 
of the first two best matched firms, the industry criterion is dropped.  
13 Our results remain unchanged across all measures of post-acquisition performance when the treatment of outliers 
and overlapping observations are dropped. 
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acquiring firm 4 weeks before the acquisition announcement. Both a positive (Asquith et al., 
1983) and a negative (Travlos, 1987) relation between deal size and announcement period 
abnormal returns has been documented.  
Acquisition performance can also be affected by past stock-price performance, cash 
holdings and growth opportunities of the acquiring firm. Past stock-price performance (Runup) is 
measured as the acquirer’s buy-and-hold return between 205 days and 6 days preceding the 
acquisition announcement minus the buy-and-hold return of the matched firm described 
previously over the same time period. Rosen (2006) finds that past-performance is negatively 
related to long-run post-acquisition returns. We define Cash as the acquirer’s balance of cash and 
equivalents divided by book value of total assets. Under Jensen’s (1988) free cash flow theory, 
managers of strong performing firms can be driven by hubris and destroy value in acquisitions 
by overpaying for targets. Harford (1999) also shows that managerial hubris increases in the 
presence of excess cash. B/M is the ratio of the bidder’s book value of equity to market value of 
equity. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that acquirers with low book-to-market ratio experience 
poor post-acquisition performance. Dong et al. (2006) find a positive relation between the book-
to-market ratio of the acquiring firm and the market reaction to acquisition announcements.  
Following Harford (1999), acquirer’s return on assets, sales growth, leverage, price-to-
earnings ratio, non-cash working capital, capital expenditures and research and development 
(R&D) expenditures are used as additional explanatory variables in the M&A selection models. 
ROA is defined previously. Sales_Growth is a forward measure of growth opportunities and is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of revenues at year t+1 divided by revenues in year t. 
P/E is the stock price of the acquiring firm divided by earnings per share. Leverage is acquirer’s 
book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Leverage is also used as a control 
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variable when we examine the relation between incentive compensation and deal performance, 
as Moeller et al. (2004) show that leverage is negatively correlated with announcement returns. 
NC_Working_Cap is equal to acquirer’s current assets net of cash and equivalents minus current 
liabilities, divided by book value of total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by book 
value of total assets. R&D is defined as research and development expenses divided by book 
value of total assets.14  
Finally, in models examining long-run performance following merger completion we also 
control for selection bias since not all acquiring firms are expected to have survived for 3 years 
following the transaction. The model requires the use of an instrumental variable in the first-
stage model predicting firm survival over the post-acquisition period that does not appear in the 
second-stage regression to explain long-run post-acquisition performance. We define 
Months_Surv. as the number of months between the first acquisition made by the acquiring firms 
during the merger wave sample period January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2010 and the most 
recent deal that we evaluate long-run performance surrounding. If the company has not made a 
previous acquisition during the 1981 to 2010 period this variable takes the value of zero. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1.Executive compensation and the propensity to acquire 
Table 3 presents differences in compensation characteristics between CEOs that initiate 
acquisitions during merger waves and CEOs that acquire outside a wave for the merged sample. 
Panel A presents dollar values for delta, vega and cash compensation.  
The wealth of managers who initiate in-wave acquisitions appears to be less sensitive to 
changes in stock price and stock return volatility in comparison to the wealth of out-wave 
                                                          
14 When the value of research and development expenditure is missing from Compustat we set it equal to zero. 
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acquiring managers. The wealth of out-wave acquiring CEOs changes by $1,605,730 for a 1% 
change in the stock price compared to a $1,348,980 change in the wealth of in-wave acquiring 
CEOs, but the difference in is not statistically significant. The average change in the wealth of 
CEOs for in-wave deals for a 1% change in the standard deviation of stock returns is $157,750 
compared to $177,620 for out-wave acquiring CEOs and the difference in vega is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. A significantly lower vega during in-wave time periods 
suggests that managerial wealth is less sensitive to risk during active takeover markets. We 
interpret this as evidence of sub-optimal contracting where managers are less sensitive to stock 
price risk when making investment decisions during in-wave time periods. Weaker compensation 
incentives can dampen risk-inducing incentives from executive compensation during active 
takeover markets, and reduce the quality of merger decisions. Panel A also shows that the 
average dollar value of cash compensation for in-wave acquiring CEOs is higher relative to that 
of out-wave acquiring CEOs. This can further result in value-decreasing decisions since a high 
proportion of cash compensation can increase managerial entrenchment and negatively affect 
firm performance (Berger et al., 1997; Brick et al., 2006). 
Since dollar differences in incentive compensation can stem from differences in firm size 
and the total value of the compensation package, Panel B presents differences in compensation 
variables standardized by CEO total compensation. The difference in pay-performance 
sensitivity between in-wave and out-wave acquiring CEOs remains statistically insignificant. In 
contrast, the difference in the sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to stock return volatility remains 
important economically and statistically. After scaling by total compensation, vega incentives 
during out-wave periods are 1.68 times higher relative to in-wave periods. The difference in cash 
compensation also remains statistically important at the 1 percent level. In-wave acquiring CEOs 
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receive 2.1% more of their total compensation through salary and cash bonus payments than out-
wave acquiring CEOs. The results suggest that the findings in Panel A are robust to controlling 
for firm size.  
These findings provide preliminary evidence allowing the rejection of H1, showing that 
managers who make out-wave acquisitions are better incentivized than those who acquire during 
merger waves. This can provide a partial explanation for the documented underperformance of 
in-wave acquisitions (Bouwman et al., 2009; Goel and Thakor, 2010), in as much as the wealth 
of acquiring CEOs making acquisitions during in-wave periods is less sensitive to stock price 
risk relative to acquiring CEOs undertaking mergers during out-wave time periods. 
We extend these univariate results, and control for selection bias in focusing only on 
acquiring firms, by examining whether the propensity to acquire is affected by CEO incentives, 
and whether this varies conditional on merger waves. To avoid selection bias, we conduct this 
testing using the ExecuComp sample of 30,995 firm-year observations. Since corporate 
acquisitions are investment decisions that increase firm risk, a positive relation is expected 
between the sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to stock return volatility and the propensity to acquire 
(Coles et al., 2006; Croci and Petmezas, 2015).  
Following Harford (1999), we construct a probit model that predicts acquiring firms 
based on a number of explanatory variables at the year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement. The dependent variable, Acquisition, equals one if a firm makes an acquisition 
announcement in a given year and zero otherwise. In addition to our compensation variables, the 
propensity to acquire is also related to firm characteristics including acquirer’s size, past 
performance, cash holdings, growth prospects, leverage, and non-cash working capital.  
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Table 4 presents the results. Model 1 confirms our base predictions, showing that higher 
vega increases the propensity to acquire. On the other hand, pay-performance sensitivity, delta, is 
unrelated to the likelihood of making an acquisition. The relation between the likelihood to 
acquire and cash compensation is positive and statistically strong. While inconsistent with 
incentive compensation predictions (Datta et al., 2001) the finding is in line with Croci and 
Petmezas (2015) and Cohen et al. (2013) who find that cash compensation is positively 
associated with investment in risky projects. By construction, the In-Wave_Year dummy is 
positively related to the likelihood of acquisitions. 
The remaining control variables are also according to expectations. Large and cash-rich 
firms are more likely to acquire (Harford, 1999) and so are firms with good past stock-price 
performance, indicating that acquisition decisions may be driven by managerial hubris (Roll, 
1986). On the other hand, highly leveraged firms tend to avoid the increased risk associated with 
acquisitions. The propensity to acquire is also positively related to growth opportunities, as 
measured by recent sales growth and the bidder’s book-to-market ratio. 
In Model 2 we introduce interaction terms between incentive compensation variables and 
the In-Wave_Year dummy to examine whether the positive impact of incentive compensation on 
the propensity to acquire varies across merger wave conditions. We find that the coefficient of 
Delta_CEO*In-Wave_Year is insignificant, which is unsurprising given the findings in Model 1 
and the statistically insignificant difference in Delta_CEO between in-wave and out-wave 
acquiring managers in Table 3.  
We find that the coefficient of Vega_CEO*In-Wave_Year is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, offsetting the positive impact of Vega_CEO on the propensity 
to initiate acquisitions. The (unreported) p-value of the joint coefficient Vega_CEO + Vega*In-
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Wave_Year is 0.963 showing that the joint coefficient is statistically insignificant. The positive 
coefficient for Vega_CEO implies that sensitivity to stockholder risk increases the likelihood of 
managers making merger decisions.  The significant and negative coefficient on the interaction 
term though indicates that offering risk-taking incentives to managers during wave periods does 
not increase acquisition investments. The signs and significance of the remaining control 
variables are identical to those in Model 1. 
Partitioning the sample into in-wave and out-wave years in Models 3 and 4 respectively 
confirms the results of Model 2. While both measures of incentive compensation are unrelated to 
the propensity to acquire during in-wave years, Vega_CEO is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level in Model 4, which examines the propensity to acquire for out-wave firm-
years. The results show that incentive compensation induces acquisition activity only outside of 
merger waves, which allows us to reject the null H1. If in-wave acquisitions destroy stockholder 
value, as shown in prior literature, our findings are consistent with the incentive-alignment 
hypothesis.15 
 
4.2.Deal performance across in-wave and out-wave periods 
Prior to examining the relation between incentive compensation and firm performance, we first 
confirm the long-run underperformance of merger transactions inside and outside of merger 
waves. Table 5 presents the output of multivariate regressions that examine the relation between 
merger waves and both short- and long-run performance for the merged sample. The key 
explanatory variable of interest in Table 5 is In-Wave. If in-wave acquirers underperform relative 
                                                          
15 Our core results on the relation between vega, merger waves and the propensity to acquire are consistent when we 
re-estimate our regression models using deal values for all acquisitions during the financial year as the dependent 
variable. We replace the Acquisition dummy variable with Acquisition_Spending, which is the sum of all deal values 
for completed mergers meeting our sample selection criteria during the firm’s financial year scaled by total revenues 
at the previous year-end. We estimate these models using Tobit regressions. 
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to their out-wave counterparts, the coefficient of In-Wave should take a negative and statistically 
significant value.  
In Model 1 we examine difference in short-run stock price returns surrounding the 
announcement date. The coefficient of In-Wave is statistically insignificant showing that short-
term announcement returns do not vary between in-wave and out-wave periods for our sample, 
confirming the findings of Duchin and Schmidt (2013). The coefficients of our control variables 
are according to expectations. Acquisition announcement returns are negatively related to the 
size of the acquiring firm (Moeller et al., 2004) and the relative size of the transaction (Travlos, 
1987). The market reacts more positively to acquisitions financed by cash relative to stock deals 
(Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Travlos, 1987) and the value destruction in public deals 
(Fuller et al., 2002, Officer 2007) is confirmed by the negative coefficient of the Public variable. 
The results also indicate that the decision to acquire can be driven by managerial hubris as both 
bidders’ past stock-price performance and cash holdings are negatively related to the market 
reaction, confirming Jensen’s (1988) free cash flows theory and the findings of Rosen (2006). 
The negative impact of managerial hubris on firm value highlights the potential importance of 
compensation-related managerial incentives in acquisition decisions.  
The next two sets of models (Models 2-3 and 4-5) test whether long-term post-acquisition 
stock price and operating performance respectively differs between in-wave and out-wave 
acquirers. Since not all acquiring firms survive for three years following the acquisition, we 
control for selection bias using Heckman (1979) two-step selection model. The dependent 
variable for the probit regressions (Models 2 and 4) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the acquirer survives for three years following the acquisition effective date, and zero 
otherwise. The instrumental variable explaining survival following the first acquisition by the 
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acquiring firm during our sample period, Months_Surv., is positively related to the likelihood of 
surviving for three years following the transaction. The difference between the number of total 
and uncensored observations indicate that the bidders of 1,139 transactions in the merged sample 
don’t survive as independent entities for three years post acquisition.  
Our results show that regardless of whether long-run performance is measured by 
acquirer’s 3-year abnormal buy-and-hold return or the change in ROA of the acquiring firm, 
deals initiated during merger waves underperform relative to out-wave deals. The coefficient of 
In-Wave is negative and statistical significant at the 5 percent level (1 percent level) when long-
run performance is measured by 3yABHR (ΔIROA). The findings are consistent with previous 
studies that document financial and operating long-run underperformance for acquisitions 
initiated during hot markets (Bouwman et al., 2009; Goel and Thakor, 2010).  
Examining our control variables, larger firms and firms that finance the merger with cash 
have a higher possibility to survive for three years following the transaction whereas the 
likelihood of surviving is considerably lower for undervalued firms (Models 2 and 4). The latter 
is according to expectations given that undervalued firms are potential targets for relatively 
overvalued acquirers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). 
The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant only at the 10 percent 
level in Model 3, indicating that certain unobservable characteristics that increase the likelihood 
of the acquirer to survive post-acquisition are positively related to acquirer’s long-run stock-price 
performance. However, the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in Model 5, showing that selection 
bias is not an important driver of long-run operating performance post-acquisition. 
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4.3.CEO compensation, merger waves and acquisition performance 
Having confirmed that in-wave acquisitions underperform in the long-term relative to out-wave 
acquisitions, we extend this analysis to consider how incentive compensation impacts subsequent 
merger performance across in-wave and out-wave periods. Table 6 examines the relation 
between CEO compensation and short-term acquisition announcement returns for the merged 
sample. 
In Model 1 we find that vega is positively related with the market reaction to the 
announcement. This is consistent with previous research findings that acquisitions made by 
managers with higher proportions of option-based compensation experience better 
announcement returns (Datta et al., 2001; Minnick et al., 2011). In-contrast, delta is unrelated to 
merger announcement returns. Cash compensation is also positively related to the market 
reaction to acquisition announcements. 
The remaining control variables are according to expectations. Large firms experience 
lower announcement returns when they acquire (Moeller et al., 2004); acquisitions financed by 
cash have a more positive stock price response (Travlos, 1987; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004); and firms with strong past performance and higher levels of cash appear to destroy value 
in corporate takeovers (Jensen, 1988). Acquisition announcement returns are also lower when the 
size of the deal is large relative to the size of the acquiring firm (Travlos, 1987) and when the 
target is a publicly listed firm (Fuller et al., 2002; Officer, 2007).  
Models 2 and 3 partition acquisitions into those initiated inside and outside of merger 
waves respectively. We find that delta is unrelated to announcement returns in both cases. We do 
find that vega is positively related to announcement returns only outside of merger waves. We 
interpret this finding as suggesting that although risk-based incentive compensation is positively 
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correlated with short-term returns outside of merger waves, the managerial euphoria and hubris 
that characterize periods of merger waves override the positive impact of incentive pay on 
decision making. In addition, as shown in Table 3, in-wave acquiring managers are provided 
with weaker incentives regarding the sensitivity of their wealth to firm risk relative to out-wave 
acquiring managers, suggesting that weaker compensation incentives are ineffective in 
motivating stockholder value-maximizing decisions during in-wave periods. 
Turning to long-run post-acquisition performance, Table 5 shows that in-wave acquirers 
experience lower abnormal buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the three years following the 
merger than firms that acquire during out-wave periods. Table 7 examines whether this 
difference in long-run stock-price performance can be attributed to differences in the structure of 
CEO compensation. Similar to section 4.2, issues of selection bias are addressed using the two-
step selection method developed by Heckman (1979). Models 1, 3 and 5 present the output of 
probit regressions where the dependent variable equals one if the acquiring firm survives 3 years 
after the transaction, and zero otherwise. Models 2, 4 and 6 present second-stage OLS 
regressions that examine the impact of CEO compensation, firm and deal characteristics on 
acquirer’s 3-year post-acquisition abnormal buy-and-hold return. The second-stage OLS 
regressions include surviving firms only. 
Models 1 and 2 present the results for the full merged sample. Model 1 shows that delta is 
positively related to the likelihood of surviving three years following the acquisition. Both vega 
and delta are also positively related to acquirer’s 3yABHR in Model 2 showing that when CEO 
compensation is more closely linked to stock price performance and volatility respectively, 
managers make acquisitions that increase value for acquiring firm stockholders in the long-run. 
Datta et al., (2001) also report a significant and positive relation between equity-based 
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compensation and post-acquisition stock price performance. Cash compensation has a strong, 
negative relation with the probability of firm survival and is weakly positively associated with 
long-run acquisition performance. The Mills ratio is insignificant in Model 2.   
Models 4 and 6 present results for the relation between incentive compensation and long-
run post acquisition performance separately for in-wave and out-wave acquisitions respectively. 
Model 4 shows that both delta and vega are unrelated to long-run stock-price performance when 
acquisitions for in-wave mergers. On the other hand, we find in Model 6 that delta and vega are 
statistically significant and positively related to acquirer’s long-run financial performance when 
acquisitions are initiated outside of merger waves.  
Combined with our univariate comparison of incentive compensation in Table 3 the 
results presented here indicate that the long-run underperformance of in-wave mergers can, at 
least partially, be attributed to weak compensation incentives provided to in-wave acquiring 
CEOs. The results are similar to those for short-run acquiring firm performance; Vega_CEO in 
Model 4 is statistically insignificant while Vega_CEO in Model 6 is positively related to long-
run stock performance post-merger. We propose that increased information asymmetry and 
resulting weak monitoring of acquiring firm managers during merger waves reduces the penalties 
for making bad acquisitions (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013). Moreover, during in-wave periods 
managers are able to benefit from greater increases in ex-post compensation following even 
poorly performing mergers (Goel and Thakor, 2010), which outweighs the ex-ante compensation 
benefits from their existing compensation package. These effects offset the positive impact of ex-
ante pay incentives on the quality of acquisition decisions during in-wave periods. 
Other firm and deal characteristics in Table 7 also favor out-wave acquisitions. Cash 
acquirers experience higher long-run stock-price returns only when they acquire outside of 
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merger waves. A positive relation between diversifying acquisitions and long-term performance 
is also documented only for out-wave deals. In addition, the negative relation between cash 
holdings and acquisition performance is restricted to in-wave transactions. Jointly, the findings 
from Tables 5 to 7 lead to the rejection of the null H2.  
The final test in this section examines the relation between executive compensation and 
long-run operating performance. Table 8 presents the results for the full merged sample. We 
control for selection bias using the same method outlined previously. The coefficient of 
Delta_CEO in all three first stage probit regressions (Models 1, 3 and 5) is positive and 
significant, showing that the higher sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to stock price changes increases 
the acquirer’s likelihood of surviving three years following the acquisition. However, in contrast 
to our findings for long-run stock-price performance, both vega and delta are unrelated to post-
acquisition operating performance in Models 2, 4 and 6. 
For our control variables, cash compensation is negatively related to the likelihood of the 
acquiring firm surviving for three years following the merger. The coefficient of the inverse 
Mills ratio is not statistically significant in any model indicating that bidder’s operating 
performance is not driven by unobservable characteristics related to surviving firms. The book-
to-market ratio is positively related to long-run changes in operating performance post-
acquisition, which is consistent with superior performance for value relative to glamour 
acquiring firms (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). 
 
4.4.Merger waves and dispersion of acquisition returns 
Our results so far show that in-wave bidders experience lower post-acquisition returns relative to 
out-wave bidders and that this difference can, at least partially, be attributed to weaker incentives 
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provided to out-wave acquiring managers via their compensation contracts. In this section, we 
examine whether the dispersion of post-acquisition abnormal returns varies between high and 
low incentive compensation managers and across in-wave and out-wave acquiring firms in order 
to test hypothesis H3. If the decision to acquire during a merger wave is associated with higher 
adverse selection costs, we expect higher dispersion of cross-sectional post-acquisition returns 
for in-wave acquirers relative to out-wave acquiring firms. During waves, adverse selection costs 
are higher, target firm quality is more difficult to determine and therefore acquiring firms are 
more likely to over-pay for target firms. Initiating acquisitions during periods of high adverse 
selection costs is expected to lead to greater variation in the quality of merger decisions and 
result in a high dispersion of the potential outcomes. 
Following Yung et al. (2008) we calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
acquirer’s daily cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal buy-and-hold returns for four 
different time intervals: 3 months, 6 months, 9 months and 12 months. CARs and ABHRs are 
calculated as described previously using the returns on the market value-weighted index and 
control matched firms respectively as benchmarks. This approach assumes that private 
information on acquirer and target firm quality is released to the market following completion of 
the acquisition, which contributes to the dispersion of post-acquisition returns. 
Table 9 presents the results of this testing. We confirm that the cross-sectional dispersion 
of post-acquisition returns is significantly higher for in-wave deals relative to out-wave deals 
using all eight measures and post-acquisition time periods. Taking the 6-month CARs (ABHRs), 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns is 0.2700 (0.3675) for in-wave acquirers and 
0.2309 (0.3262) for out-wave acquiring firms. All differences are significant at the 1 percent 
level based on an F-test comparison of sample variances. The cross-sectional dispersion of 
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ABHRs is higher than for CARs in any given time period. This arises because the returns of 
control firms are more volatile than returns on the market index, which increases the variance of 
the difference between the acquiring firm’s return and that of the benchmark (Yung et al., 2008). 
We propose that the higher dispersion of post-acquisition returns for wave periods is driven by 
higher adverse selection costs during wave periods and the reduced ability to monitor the actions 
of acquiring managers. This leads to an increase in the number of low quality acquisitions during 
wave periods.  
Our previous findings show that incentive compensation leads to higher quality merger 
decisions, on average, based on short- and long-term stock price performance. We now extend 
this analysis to examine how incentive compensation affects the cross-sectional dispersion of 
abnormal returns. This provides a measure of the relation between incentive compensation and 
consistency in the quality of merger decisions. These results are presented in Table 10. The 
sample is partitioned into High and Low incentives based on the level of incentive compensation 
provided to bidder’s CEO. Bidding firms with Delta_CEO above the sample median are 
classified as High Delta and bidding firms with Delta_CEO equal to or lower than the sample 
median are classified as Low Delta. Similarly, acquirers with Vega_CEO above the sample 
median are classified as High Vega and the remaining ones as Low Vega.  
Panel A presents differences in the standard deviation of cross-sectional acquisition 
returns based on different levels of incentive compensation for the full sample of acquiring firms. 
High Vega firms experience significantly lower cross-sectional dispersion of returns than Low 
Vega acquirers over each time period and measure of abnormal returns. All differences are 
significant at the 1 percent level. Our findings for delta are somewhat weaker. Differences in 
delta cannot explain any difference in the cross-sectional standard deviation of CARs, but the 
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dispersion of buy-and-hold returns is lower for high delta managers for up to 9 months following 
mergers. The findings are in line with expectations given that vega measures CEO’s risk-seeking 
compensation incentives and can therefore explain changes in risk-related parameters better than 
delta (Coles et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2013).  
Panels B and C present the dispersion of cross-sectional returns for in-wave and out-wave 
acquirers respectively. We final in Panel B that compensation incentives provided to in-wave 
acquiring managers cannot explain differences in the post-acquisition cross-sectional standard 
deviation of returns in this group of firms.16 On the other hand, the findings in Panel C show that 
higher sensitivity of out-wave acquiring CEOs’ wealth to stock returns volatility can explain 
cross-sectional dispersion in post-acquisition abnormal returns. Out-wave acquiring managers 
with higher vega make more consistent acquisition decisions based on the dispersion of post-
acquisition abnormal returns. The results are again stronger for vega than for delta, which is in 
line with the findings in the previous section. Collectively, the results in this section provide 
strong support to reject the null H3. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We present new evidence to show that the underperformance of acquisitions initiated during 
merger waves can be explained, in part, by differences in the compensation incentives of 
acquiring firm managers. We find that CEOs who make acquisitions outside of merger waves are 
better incentivized than their counterparts who initiate in-wave acquisitions. The wealth of out-
wave acquiring managers is more sensitive to the volatility of stock price returns while in-wave 
acquiring managers receive a higher proportion of cash compensation.  
                                                          
16 With the exception of the difference in 12-month CARs between High Vega and Low Vega acquirers. 
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In line with the efficient contracting hypothesis we find that pay-risk sensitivity is 
positively associated with the propensity to acquire. However, this relation is observed only 
outside of merger wave periods. In-wave acquisitions are subject to greater adverse selection 
concerns for acquiring firm stockholders. Better incentivized out-wave acquiring managers can 
overcome such concerns but this is not the case for in-wave acquiring CEOs in the presence of 
weaker ex-ante compensation incentives and reduced monitoring during in-wave periods.  
These differences in the structure of executive compensation have direct implications for 
the performance of the acquiring firms. We find that pay-risk sensitivity is positively associated 
with both short-term and long-term stock price performance of acquiring firms only when an 
acquisition is initiated outside a merger wave. In contrast, the weaker incentives provided to in-
wave acquiring CEOs, along with higher adverse selection costs and managerial hubris 
surrounding periods of merger waves offset the positive impact of incentive compensation on 
firm performance. As a result, in-wave deals also experience greater dispersion of cross-sectional 
acquisition returns. 
Our findings show that offering equity-related incentives to managers who acquire during 
merger waves fails to increase value for acquiring firm stockholders. Since this form of 
compensation can be costly for the firm, awarding restricted stock and option grants when it is 
inefficient to do so can result in further value destruction for stockholders. More generally, our 
findings show that remuneration committees should consider external market conditions in 
setting appropriate ex-ante incentives for CEOs to engage in risky investment decisions. 
 Our findings also add to the body of literature that focuses on the long-run 
underperformance of mergers during waves. We extend the analysis of Duchin and Schmidt 
(2013) who show that higher adverse selection costs and resulting weak monitoring incentives 
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for acquiring firm managers can partially explain the low quality of these decisions on average. 
Our findings show that part of the explanation for this poor post-acquisition performance lie in 
the weak compensation incentives provided to acquiring firm managers during in-wave relative 
to out-wave periods. 
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Table 1: Distribution of merger waves across industries and time 
The table presents the distribution of 74 merger waves for the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classifications 
across time. Merger waves last for two years and are identified based on the method developed by Harford (2005) 
for a sample of 35,829 completed U.S. acquisitions from SDC Platinum over the period January 1, 1981 to 
December 31, 2010.  
Industry 
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 
Start of 
Wave No of bids 
Start of 
Wave No of bids 
Start of 
Wave No of bids 
Agriculture   
 
Feb-96 28   
 Aircraft Jul-83 25 Sep-97 37   
 Alcoholic Beverages   
 
  
 
  
 Apparel   
 
  
 
Nov-04 43 
Automobiles and Trucks   
 
Jun-96 77   
 Banking Apr-82 356 Nov-96 676 Jul-03 339 
Business Services Jan-89 165 Sep-98 1,491 Jan-01 812 
Business Supplies   
 
Jul-97 54   
 Candy and Soda   
 
  
 
  
 Chemicals   
 
Aug-97 88   
 Coal   
 
  
 
Jul-04 27 
Computers   
 
Apr-98 331 Jan-01 181 
Construction Oct-82 27 Dec-96 110   
 Construction Materials Feb-83 67 Aug-96 109 Feb-03 62 
Consumer Goods   
 
Jan-97 85   
 Defense   
 
Dec-96 19   
 Electrical Equipment   
 
Mar-95 63   
 Electronic Equipment Nov-82 76 Jan-99 431 Feb-01 251 
Entertainment   
 
Oct-96 155   
 Fabricated Products   
 
Apr-96 36   
 Food Products   
 
Jul-97 63 Dec-05 42 
Healthcare Jan-83 81 Jan-96 324 Dec-04 136 
Insurance   
 
Jun-96 157 Oct-01 86 
Machinery   
 
Sep-96 214 Jan-06 109 
Measuring & Control Equip Jan-83 48 Dec-95 108   
 Medical Equipment   
 
May-95 158 Feb-05 133 
Miscellaneous   
 
  
 
  
 Nonmetallic Mining   
 
  
 
  
 Personal Services   
 
Jan-97 102   
 Petroleum and Natural Gas Jan-83 117 Jun-96 291 Jan-06 238 
Pharmaceutical Products   
 
Jun-98 124   
 Precious Metals   
 
  
 
  
 Printing and Publishing   
 
Jun-97 61   
 Real Estate Mar-83 42 Feb-97 693 Jan-05 195 
Recreational Products   
 
Nov-96 53   
 Restaurants, Hotel, Motel Feb-83 46 Jul-96 366 Feb-05 118 
Retail   
 
Sep-96 276 May-05 119 
Rubber and Plastic Products   
 
Aug-97 53   
 Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq   
 
Jul-97 16   
 Shipping Containers   
 
  
 
  
 Steel Works, Etc. Apr-82 33 May-96 81   
 Telecommunications Apr-82 97 Jan-99 414 Jan-01 186 
Textiles   
 
  
 
  
 Tobacco Products   
 
  
 
  
 Trading Feb-82 252 Nov-96 1,107 Apr-05 584 
Transportation   
 
Sep-96 166 Dec-05 92 
Utilities Jan-89 59 Dec-96 135   
 Wholesale Jun-83 82 Dec-96 407 Jun-05 145 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions from SDC Platinum over 
the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock 
price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. Definitions of all variables are as described in the 
appendix. 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Number of 
Observations 
Compensation Variables   
     Delta_CEO ($000s) 1,524 15,877 68 222 681 7,689 
Vega_CEO ($000s) 171 427 11 44 146 7,689 
Cash_Comp_CEO ($000s) 1,737 2,432 720 1,169 1,946 7,689 
Total_Comp_CEO ($000s) 7,196 16,126 1,550 3,147 7,317 7,689 
 
  
     Deal & Firm Characteristics   
     Size 14.884 1.645 13.670 14.670 15.910 7,859 
Relative_Size 0.120 0.248 0.012 0.039 0.113 7,859 
Runup 0.043 0.823 -0.218 0.036 0.310 7,829 
Cash 0.154 0.179 0.026 0.076 0.225 7,821 
B/M 0.592 0.282 0.370 0.590 0.820 7,799 
ROA 0.132 0.105 0.064 0.131 0.191 7,854 
Sales_Growth 0.065 0.124 0.004 0.045 0.106 7,708 
Leverage 0.228 0.168 0.096 0.211 0.331 6,937 
R&D 0.034 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.049 7,859 
CAPEX 0.046 0.058 0.010 0.030 0.060 7,713 
P/E 25.318 165.185 12.794 19.160 30.729 7,813 
NC_Working_Cap 0.130 0.165 0.011 0.111 0.227 6,244 
Months_Surv. 91 79 24 74 144 7,859 
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Table 3: Difference in CEO compensation between in-wave and out-wave acquirers 
The table presents differences in CEO compensation incentives between in-wave and out-wave acquiring firms. The 
sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC 
Platinum. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp. Delta_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth 
for a 1 percent change in firm’s stock price. Vega_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change 
in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns. Cash_Comp_CEO is the sum of CEO’s salary and bonus. 
Total_Comp_CEO is the sum of CEO’s salary, bonus, new stock and option grants and other forms of 
compensation. Transactions are classified as in-wave or out-wave following the method developed by Harford 
(2005). t-statistics are from the t-test for difference in means. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Compensation Characteristics (dollar value) 
  In-Wave Out-Wave Difference t statistic 
Delta_CEO 1,348.98 1,605.73 -256.75 -0.75 
Observations 2,437 5,252 
    
    Vega_CEO 157.75 177.62 -19.88** -2.08 
Observations 2,437 5,252 
    
    Cash_Comp_CEO 1,875.77 1,672.06 203.71*** 3.02 
Observations 2,437 5,252 
             
Panel B: Compensation Characteristics scaled by Total Compensation 
  In-Wave Out-Wave Difference t statistic 
Delta_CEO / Total_Comp_CEO 0.7338 1.0466 -0.3128 -0.74 
Observations 2,437 5,252 
    
    Vega_CEO / Total_Comp_CEO 0.0203 0.0342 -0.0139*** -2.85 
Observations 2,437 5,252 
    
    Cash_Comp_CEO /  Total_Comp_CEO 0.4828 0.4619 0.0209*** 2.81 
Observations 2,437 5,252 
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Table 4: Compensation incentives and the propensity to acquire 
The table presents the results of probit regressions for the extended ExecuComp sample of 30,995 firm-year 
observations over the period 1992-2009.  Executive compensation data are from ExecuComp, stock price data from 
CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. The dependent variable, Acquisition, takes the value of one if a firm 
makes an acquisition announcement in a given year and zero otherwise. In-Wave_Year is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the industry experiences a merger wave during the calendar year and zero otherwise. 
Merger waves are identified based on the method developed by Harford (2005). Delta_CEO is the dollar change in 
CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s stock price. Vega_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 
percent change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns. Cash_Comp_CEO is the sum of CEO’s salary and 
bonus. Definitions of control variables are described in the Appendix. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, 
are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Variable (1) All 
(2) 
All 
(3) 
In-Wave Year 
(4) 
Out-Wave Year 
Intercept -2.8026*** -2.0756*** -2.1635*** -1.9261*** 
 
(-16.68) (-16.62) (-8.98) (-13.15) 
Delta_CEO 0.0012 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 
 
(1.28) (0.48) (1.05) (0.56) 
Vega_CEO 0.1003** 0.1500*** -0.0232 0.1645*** 
 
(2.51) (3.11) (-0.37) (3.21) 
Cash_Comp_CEO 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0321*** 0.0173** 
 
(3.19) (3.20) (2.95) (2.11) 
In-Wave_Year 0.2120*** 0.2290*** 
  
 
(9.87) (9.96) 
  Delta_CEO * In-Wave_Year   0.0005 
  
 
  (0.22) 
  Vega_CEO * In-Wave_Year   -0.1473** 
  
 
  (-2.07) 
  Size 0.0766*** 0.0756*** 0.0900*** 0.0684*** 
 
(9.38) (9.24) (5.83) (7.08) 
Past_ABHR 0.0220* 0.0224* 0.0771*** -0.0139 
 
(1.85) (1.88) (3.56) (-0.83) 
Cash 0.1868*** 0.1867*** 0.1385 0.1883** 
 
(2.92) (2.92) (1.16) (2.47) 
B/M -0.1909*** -0.1902*** -0.1752* -0.1994*** 
 
(-5.51) (-5.50) (-1.96) (-5.50) 
ROA 0.0167 0.0182 0.1769 -0.0401 
 
(0.19) (0.21) (1.03) (-0.39) 
Sales_Growth 0.7381*** 0.7432*** 0.6675*** 0.7744*** 
 
(8.52) (8.59) (4.25) (7.36) 
Leverage -0.1862*** -0.1863*** -0.0383 -0.2338*** 
 
(-2.70) (-2.70) (-0.29) (-2.89) 
P/E 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0011 
 
(0.00) (0.05) (-0.13) (0.15) 
NC_Working_Cap 0.1310** 0.1323** 0.4326*** 0.0114 
 
(2.17) (2.19) (3.74) (0.16) 
Number of Observations  24,844 24,844 6,041 18,803 
Wald Chi-Square    689.56***      694.52***     204.91***     381.64*** 
Pseudo R-Square 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.026 
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Table 5: Merger waves and deal performance 
The table presents the results of multivariate analysis and sample selection models following Heckman (1979) of 
acquisition performance on deal and firm characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the 
period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Stock price data are from CRSP and accounting 
data from Compustat. The dependent variable for the first-stage regression in Heckman selection models is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the acquiring firm survives for three years after the acquisition effective date and zero 
otherwise. CARs(0.1) is the bidder's cumulative abnormal returns over a two-day event window (0, +1) where 0 is 
the announcement date using the market model. The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the 
acquisition announcement. 3yABHR is the bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily returns following the acquisition 
effective date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily returns of the matching firm for the same period. ΔIROA is the 
difference between the acquirer’s return on assets (ROA) at the end of the second year following the transaction 
(t+2) and the acquirer’s ROA at the end of the year preceding the transaction (t-1) adjusted for the industry median. 
ROA is defined as Operating Income before Depreciation divided by total assets. The Months_Surv. variable 
measures the number of months the acquiring firm has survived since its first acquisition during the period January 
1, 1981, to December 31, 2010. In-Wave is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition has been 
initiated during a merger wave and zero otherwise.  Transactions are classified as in-wave or out-wave following the 
method developed by Harford (2005). Definitions of control variables are described in the Appendix. t-statistics, 
based on robust standard errors, are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
Variable (1) CARs(0.1) 
(2) 
Selection 
(3) 
3yABHR 
(4) 
Selection 
(5) 
ΔIROA 
Intercept 3.9841*** 0.0780 0.1870 0.3035 -0.0499** 
 
(6.77) (0.36) (0.59) (1.30) (-2.28) 
In-Wave -0.0993   -0.0636**   -0.0103*** 
 
(-0.31)   (-2.41)   (-4.69) 
Months_Surv.   0.0011***   0.0011*** 
 
 
  (4.25)   (4.00) 
 Size -0.2107*** 0.0717*** -0.0196 0.0444*** 0.0011 
 
(-6.21) (5.40) (-1.28) (3.09) (1.13) 
Payment_Cash 0.4019*** 0.1287*** 0.0903** 0.1527*** -0.0039 
 
(3.75) (3.29) (2.52) (3.67) (-1.30) 
Diversifying -0.0560 0.0962** 0.0880*** 0.0982** 0.0005 
 
(-0.55) (2.56) (2.84) (2.46) (0.21) 
Runup -0.2349*** 0.0215 -0.0245 0.0091 0.0019 
 
(-3.13) (1.03) (-1.49) (0.42) (1.53) 
Cash -0.8225** -0.5520*** -0.1824 -0.5457*** -0.0056 
 
(-2.29) (-5.10) (-1.42) (-4.75) (-0.57) 
Public -1.2771*** -0.0113 -0.0103 0.0042 -0.0030 
 
(-8.66) (-0.21) (-0.27) (0.07) (-1.05) 
Private -0.1344 -0.0156 -0.0169 -0.0670 -0.0010 
 
(-1.15) (-0.35) (-0.54) (-1.43) (-0.38) 
Relative_Size -0.6388* 0.0196 0.0217 0.1210 -0.0055 
 
(-1.88) (0.25) (0.36) (1.51) (-1.28) 
B/M -0.4200** -0.3541*** -0.1548** -0.3500*** 0.0462*** 
 
(-1.97) (-4.84) (-2.07) (-4.58) (8.05) 
Inverse_Mills     0.7163*   -0.0035 
 
    (1.66)   (-0.11) 
Total Observations 7,376 7,416   5,741   
Uncensored Observ. -        6,277 
 
         4,602 
F-statistic        22.95*** - - 
Wald Chi-Square - 40.56*** 193.02*** 
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Table 6: Bidder’s announcement returns, merger waves and CEO compensation 
The table presents multivariate regression results of bidder’s two-day CARs (0.1) on CEO compensation and other 
firm and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to 
December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data 
from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. The dependent variable is CARs(0.1) and it is defined as the 
bidder's cumulative abnormal returns over a two-day event window (0, +1) where 0 is the announcement date using 
the market model. The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the acquisition announcement. 
Delta_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s stock price. Vega_CEO is the 
dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns. 
Cash_Comp_CEO is the sum of CEO’s salary and bonus. Transactions are classified as in-wave or out-wave 
following the method developed by Harford (2005). Definitions of control variables are described in the Appendix. 
t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
Variable (1) Full Sample 
(2) 
In-Waves 
(3) 
Out-Waves 
Intercept 5.3065*** 4.8863*** 5.3910*** 
 
(8.08) (3.94) (6.95) 
Delta_CEO 0.0055 0.0039 0.0059 
 
(1.14) (0.17) (0.91) 
Vega_CEO 0.4167*** 0.2670 0.4558*** 
 
(3.02) (1.05) (2.78) 
Cash_Comp_CEO 0.0523*** 0.0477* 0.0570** 
 
(2.77) (1.75) (2.01) 
Size -0.3073*** -0.2924*** -0.3095*** 
 
(-7.68) (-3.93) (-6.46) 
Payment_Cash 0.3845*** 0.6076*** 0.2821** 
 
(3.59) (2.98) (2.22) 
Diversifying -0.0633 0.1829 -0.1726 
 
(-0.62) (0.98) (-1.40) 
Runup -0.2252*** -0.2222** -0.2325* 
 
(-2.99) (-2.34) (-1.82) 
Cash -0.9201** -0.5965 -1.0334** 
 
(-2.55) (-0.92) (-2.36) 
Public -1.2639*** -1.1301*** -1.3225*** 
 
(-8.58) (-4.02) (-7.61) 
Private -0.1486 -0.2826 -0.0758 
 
(-1.27) (-1.27) (-0.55) 
Relative_Size -0.6845** -0.1924 -0.8593** 
 
(-2.02) (-0.29) (-2.20) 
B/M -0.4711** -0.6245 -0.3815 
 
(-2.22) (-1.63) (-1.48) 
Number of Observations 7,376 2,321 5,055 
F-Statistic            20.92***              7.23***            14.49*** 
R-Squared 0.037 0.036 0.039 
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Table 7: Bidder’s long-run financial performance, merger waves and CEO compensation 
The table presents the results of sample selection models following Heckman (1979) of acquisition long-run 
financial performance on CEO compensation and other firm and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed 
U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Data on executive 
compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. The 
dependent variable for the first-stage regression in Heckman selection models is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the acquiring firm survives for three years after the acquisition effective date and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable for the second-stage regression is 3yABHR which is the bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily returns 
following the acquisition effective date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily returns of the matching firm for the 
same period. Delta_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s stock price. 
Vega_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock 
returns. Cash_Comp_CEO is the sum of CEO’s salary and bonus. The Months_Surv. variable measures the number 
of months the acquiring firm has survived since its first acquisition during the period January 1, 1981, to December 
31, 2010. Transactions are classified as in-wave or out-wave following the method developed by Harford (2005). 
Definitions of control variables are described in the Appendix. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Variable 
Full Sample In-Wave Acquisitions Out-Wave Acquisitions 
(1) 
Selection 
(2) 
3yABHR 
(3) 
Selection 
(4) 
3yABHR 
(5) 
Selection 
(6) 
3yABHR 
Intercept 0.1220 0.7002** 0.2358 0.5460 0.0164 0.8065* 
 
(0.50) (2.51) (0.56) (1.56) (0.05) (1.96) 
Delta_CEO 0.0426*** 0.0020*** 0.0470* 0.0020 0.0421** 0.0018** 
 
(3.05) (2.64) (1.90) (1.26) (2.39) (2.12) 
Vega_CEO 0.0892 0.0836** 0.1342 -0.0108 0.0649 0.1031*** 
 
(1.24) (2.57) (0.93) (-0.17) (0.78) (2.69) 
Cash_Comp_CEO -0.0348*** 0.0136* -0.0247** 0.0131 -0.0447*** 0.0205* 
 
(-4.58) (1.88) (-2.32) (1.61) (-4.01) (1.74) 
Months_Surv. 0.0010*** 
 
0.0020*** 
 
0.0006** 
 
 
(4.16) 
 
(4.24) 
 
(2.05) 
 Size 0.0680*** -0.0525*** 0.0581** -0.0394** 0.0781*** -0.0603*** 
 
(4.32) (-3.56) (2.17) (-2.04) (3.91) (-2.82) 
Payment_Cash 0.1275*** 0.0717** 0.1299* -0.0258 0.1293*** 0.1079** 
 
(3.24) (2.28) (1.83) (-0.53) (2.71) (2.58) 
Diversifying 0.1027*** 0.0684** 0.0611 0.0581 0.1377*** 0.0847** 
 
(2.72) (2.45) (0.95) (1.38) (2.89) (2.12) 
Runup 0.0190 -0.0254 0.0568** -0.0329 -0.0446 -0.0034 
 
(0.91) (-1.62) (2.20) (-1.60) (-1.29) (-0.13) 
Cash -0.6027*** -0.1326 -0.5301*** -0.2674* -0.6813*** -0.0817 
 
(-5.54) (-1.19) (-2.77) (-1.73) (-5.11) (-0.49) 
Public -0.0128 -0.0113 -0.0124 -0.0447 -0.0079 -0.0011 
 
(-0.24) (-0.31) (-0.13) (-0.73) (-0.12) (-0.02) 
Private -0.0246 -0.0190 0.0734 -0.0374 -0.0689 -0.0068 
 
(-0.56) (-0.63) (0.92) (-0.73) (-1.29) (-0.17) 
Relative_Size 0.0200 0.0144 -0.1754 0.0092 0.1202 0.0127 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (-1.28) (0.08) (1.19) (0.18) 
B/M -0.2923*** -0.1143* -0.5606*** -0.2077* -0.1950** -0.1047 
 
(-3.93) (-1.84) (-4.25) (-1.88) (-2.13) (-1.39) 
Inverse_Mills   0.3690   0.5989*   0.2618 
 
  (1.11)   (1.73)   (0.50) 
Total Observations 7,416   2,363   5,053   
Uncensored Observ.   6,277   1,966   4,311 
Wald Chi-Square 59.18*** 19.92* 48.43*** 
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Table 8: Bidder’s long-run operating performance, merger waves and CEO compensation 
The table presents the results of sample selection models following Heckman (1979) of acquisition long-run 
operating performance on CEO compensation and other firm and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 
completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Data on 
executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. 
The dependent variable for the first-stage regression in Heckman selection models is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the acquiring firm survives for three years after the acquisition effective date and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable for the second-stage regression is ΔIROA which is the difference between the acquirer’s return 
on assets (ROA) at the end of the second year following the transaction (t+2) and the acquirer’s ROA at the end of 
the year preceding the transaction (t-1) adjusted for the industry median. ROA is defined as Operating Income 
before Depreciation divided by total assets. Delta_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change 
in firm’s stock price. Vega_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in the standard 
deviation of firm’s stock returns. Cash_Comp_CEO is the sum of CEO’s salary and bonus. The Months_Surv. 
variable measures the number of months the acquiring firm has survived since its first acquisition during the period 
January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2010. Transactions are classified as in-wave or out-wave following the method 
developed by Harford (2005). Definitions of control variables are described in the Appendix. t-statistics, based on 
robust standard errors, are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Variable 
Full Sample In-Wave Acquisitions Out-Wave Acquisitions 
(1) 
Selection 
(2) 
ΔIROA 
(3) 
Selection 
(4) 
ΔIROA 
(5) 
Selection 
(6) 
ΔIROA 
Intercept 0.2771 -0.0687*** 0.4534 -0.1059*** 0.1298 -0.0432 
 
(1.05) (-3.35) (0.97) (-3.11) (0.40) (-1.64) 
Delta_CEO 0.0473*** -0.0001 0.0462* -0.0001 0.0490** -0.0001 
 
(3.10) (-1.14) (1.73) (-0.39) (2.53) (-1.49) 
Vega_CEO 0.0713 -0.0042 0.1858 -0.0090 0.0119 -0.0032 
 
(0.85) (-1.28) (1.12) (-1.21) (0.12) (-0.92) 
Cash_Comp_CEO -0.0410*** -0.0001 -0.0338** -0.0005 -0.0484*** 0.0008 
 
(-4.70) (-0.08) (-2.59) (-0.47) (-3.89) (0.92) 
Months_Surv. 0.0010*** 
 
0.0020*** 
 
0.0006* 
 
 
(3.91) 
 
(4.02) 
 
(1.81) 
 Size 0.0458*** 0.0020* 0.0287 0.0037** 0.0603*** 0.0008 
 
(2.68) (1.83) (0.96) (1.98) (2.83) (0.63) 
Payment_Cash 0.1542*** -0.0026 0.1658** -0.0047 0.1487*** -0.0035 
 
(3.69) (-1.01) (2.17) (-0.93) (2.95) (-1.17) 
Diversifying 0.1076*** -0.0002 0.0711 0.0055 0.1450*** -0.0019 
 
(2.68) (-0.09) (1.02) (1.28) (2.88) (-0.66) 
Runup 0.0065 0.0017 0.0486* -0.0015 -0.0646* 0.0073*** 
 
(0.30) (1.38) (1.82) (-0.79) (-1.76) (3.77) 
Cash -0.6038*** -0.0056 -0.5400*** -0.0262* -0.6746*** 0.0093 
 
(-5.22) (-0.64) (-2.61) (-1.66) (-4.79) (0.83) 
Public 0.0001 -0.0030 0.0007 -0.0056 0.0035 -0.0028 
 
(0.00) (-1.08) (0.01) (-0.92) (0.05) (-0.91) 
Private -0.0767 -0.0013 0.0216 -0.0062 -0.1190** 0.0007 
 
(-1.63) (-0.51) (0.25) (-1.21) (-2.09) (0.24) 
Relative_Size 0.1273 -0.0045 -0.0985 -0.0044 0.2410** -0.0054 
 
(1.58) (-1.06) (-0.70) (-0.44) (2.32) (-1.06) 
B/M -0.2799*** 0.0473*** -0.5369*** 0.0621*** -0.1976** 0.0385*** 
 
(-3.59) (9.76) (-3.89) (5.60) (-2.06) (7.28) 
Inverse_Mills   0.0058 
 
0.0079   -0.0060 
 
  (0.26) 
 
(0.26)   (-0.19) 
Total Observations 5,741   1,744   3,997   
Uncensored Observ.   4,602   1,347   3,255 
Wald Chi-Square 172.76*** 91.61*** 88.52*** 
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Table 9: Standard deviation of cross sectional bidder’s returns and merger waves 
The table presents the number of acquisitions initiated inside and outside merger waves and standard deviations of 
cross-sectional acquisition returns (CARs and BHARs). The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the 
period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Stock price data are from CRSP. Cross-sectional 
standard deviations are calculated for 3-month (63 trading days), 6-month (126 trading days), 9-month (189 trading 
days) and 12-month (252 trading days) daily returns. CARs is the bidder's cumulative abnormal daily returns over 
the respective time period using the market model. The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the 
acquisition announcement. ABHRs is the bidder’s buy-and-hold daily returns following the acquisition effective date 
minus the buy-and-hold daily returns of the matching firm for the respective time period. Transactions are classified 
as in-wave or out-wave following the method developed by Harford (2005). The reported probability statistics 
[2*Pr(F<f)] are from the F-test for difference in variances. 
  In-Waves Out-Waves Difference  F-test 
SD_3m_CARs 0.1824 0.1641 0.0183 0.0000 
Observations 2,350 5,184 
  SD_6m_CARs 0.2700 0.2309 0.0390 0.0000 
Observations 2,356 5,181 
  SD_9m_CARs 0.3390 0.2865 0.0525 0.0000 
Observations 2,352 5,183 
  SD_12m_CARs 0.3880 0.3329 0.0551 0.0000 
Observations 2,352 5,187 
    
    SD_3m_ABHRs 0.2587 0.2220 0.0367 0.0000 
Observations 2,328 5,126 
  SD_6m_ABHRs 0.3675 0.3262 0.0414 0.0000 
Observations 2,303 5,099 
  SD_9m_ABHRs 0.4724 0.4139 0.0585 0.0000 
Observations 2,278 5,047 
  SD_12m_ABHRs 0.5361 0.4888 0.0473 0.0000 
Observations 2,242 4,998 
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Table 10: Standard deviation of cross sectional bidder’s returns, merger waves and CEO incentive compensation 
The table presents the number of acquisitions initiated inside and outside merger waves and standard deviations of cross-sectional acquisition returns (CARs and BHARs). 
The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Data on executive compensation are from 
ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. Cross-sectional standard deviations are calculated for 3-month (63 trading days), 6-month (126 trading days), 9-month (189 
trading days) and 12-month (252 trading days) daily returns. CARs is the bidder's cumulative abnormal daily returns over the respective time period using the market model. 
The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the acquisition announcement. ABHRs is the bidder’s buy-and-hold daily returns following the acquisition effective 
date minus the buy-and-hold daily returns of the matching firm for the respective time period. Delta_CEO is the dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in 
firm’s stock price. Firms with Delta_CEO higher than the sample median are characterized as High Delta, otherwise they are characterized as Low Delta. Vega_CEO is the 
dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns. Firms with Vega_CEO higher than the sample median are 
characterized as High Vega, otherwise they are characterized as Low Vega. Transactions are classified as in-wave or out-wave following the method developed by Harford 
(2005). The reported probability statistics [2*Pr(F<f)] are from the F-test for difference in variances. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  Observations High Delta Low Delta Difference  F-test High Vega Low Vega Difference  F-test 
SD_3m_CARs 7,534 0.1684 0.1715 -0.0031 0.2677 0.1637 0.1760 -0.0123 0.0000 
SD_6m_CARs 7,537 0.2419 0.2458 -0.0039 0.3260 0.2349 0.2526 -0.0177 0.0000 
SD_9m_CARs 7,535 0.3021 0.3059 -0.0038 0.4439 0.2914 0.3165 -0.0251 0.0000 
SD_12m_CARs 7,539 0.3500 0.3525 -0.0026 0.6564 0.3317 0.3704 -0.0387 0.0000 
  
         SD_3m_ABHRs 7,454 0.2274 0.2406 -0.0132 0.0006 0.2197 0.2476 -0.0279 0.0000 
SD_6m_ABHRs 7,402 0.3308 0.3480 -0.0173 0.0020 0.3246 0.3537 -0.0292 0.0000 
SD_9m_ABHRs 7,325 0.4226 0.4427 -0.0202 0.0048 0.4134 0.4515 -0.0381 0.0000 
SD_12m_ABHRs 7,240 0.5001 0.5070 -0.0069 0.4104 0.4819 0.5249 -0.0430 0.0000 
Panel B: In-Wave Acquisitions 
  Observations High Delta Low Delta Difference  F-test High Vega Low Vega Difference  F-test 
SD_3m_CARs 2,350 0.1824 0.1825 -0.0001 0.9814 0.1842 0.1808 0.0034 0.5230 
SD_6m_CARs 2,356 0.2687 0.2715 -0.0028 0.7214 0.2714 0.2688 0.0027 0.7347 
SD_9m_CARs 2,352 0.3379 0.3405 -0.0026 0.7930 0.3364 0.3410 -0.0046 0.6451 
SD_12m_CARs 2,352 0.3883 0.3879 0.0003 0.9772 0.3762 0.3986 -0.0225 0.0475 
  
         SD_3m_ABHRs 2,328 0.2565 0.2613 -0.0049 0.5204 0.2543 0.2627 -0.0084 0.2701 
SD_6m_ABHRs 2,303 0.3638 0.3715 -0.0077 0.4805 0.3675 0.3669 0.0006 0.9522 
SD_9m_ABHRs 2,278 0.4768 0.4656 0.0112 0.4250 0.4728 0.4718 0.0010 0.9418 
SD_12m_ABHRs 2,242 0.5399 0.5302 0.0097 0.5478 0.5242 0.5462 -0.0219 0.1714 
 
(The table is continued on the next page.) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
Panel C: Out-Wave Acquisitions 
  Observations High Delta Low Delta Difference  F-test High Vega Low Vega Difference  F-test 
SD_3m_CARs 5,184 0.1607 0.1670 -0.0063 0.0524 0.1542 0.1736 -0.0194 0.0000 
SD_6m_CARs 5,181 0.2266 0.2347 -0.0081 0.0748 0.2174 0.2443 -0.0268 0.0000 
SD_9m_CARs 5,183 0.2818 0.2904 -0.0087 0.1235 0.2701 0.3026 -0.0326 0.0000 
SD_12m_CARs 5,187 0.3284 0.3361 -0.0077 0.2401 0.3105 0.3546 -0.0440 0.0000 
  
         SD_3m_ABHRs 5,126 0.2108 0.2319 -0.0212 0.0000 0.2033 0.2400 -0.0368 0.0000 
SD_6m_ABHRs 5,099 0.3125 0.3383 -0.0257 0.0001 0.3046 0.3472 -0.0426 0.0000 
SD_9m_ABHRs 5,047 0.3918 0.4334 -0.0415 0.0000 0.3855 0.4415 -0.0560 0.0000 
SD_12m_ABHRs 4,998 0.4787 0.4977 -0.0190 0.0521 0.4629 0.5146 -0.0517 0.0000 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Compensation Variables 
Delta_CEO The dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s stock price in the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp. 
Vega_CEO The dollar change in CEO’s wealth for a 1 percent change in the standard deviation of 
firm’s stock returns in the year preceding the acquisition announcement from 
ExecuComp. 
Cash_Comp_CEO The sum of salary and bonus payments to the CEO in the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement from ExecuComp. 
Total_Comp_CEO The sum of CEO’s salary, bonus, new stock and option grants and other forms of 
compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp. 
Firm Characteristics 
Size The natural logarithm of bidder's market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
acquisition announcement date from CRSP. 
Runup The acquirer’s buy-and-hold daily returns between 205 days and 6 days before the 
acquisition announcement date minus the buy-and-hold daily returns of the matched 
firm for the same time period from CRSP. 
Past_ABHR The market-adjusted buy-and-hold daily returns of the firm for the calendar year from 
CRSP. Market returns are from the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Cash The acquirer’s cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets at the end of the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat. 
B/M The book value of equity of the acquiring firm from Compustat divided by its 
market value from CRSP at the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. 
ROA The operating income of the acquiring firm before depreciation divided by book 
value of total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement 
from Compustat. 
Sales_Growth The natural logarithm of the ratio of bidder’s sales in the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement (t-1) to sales in the previous year (t-2) from Compustat. 
Leverage The acquirer’s total debt to total assets at the end of the year before the acquisition 
announcement from Compustat. 
P/E The ratio of the stock price of the acquiring firm to earnings per share at the end of 
the year preceding the acquisition announcement. 
NC_Working_Cap The acquiring firm’s current assets minus current liabilities minus cash and cash 
equivalents standardized by book value of total assets from Compustat at the end of 
the year before the acquisition announcement. 
Months_Surv. The number of months the acquiring firm has survived since its first acquisition in 
the period January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2010. If the company has not made 
another acquisition in the past, the variable takes the value of zero. 
Merger Performance Measures 
CARs(0,1) The bidder's cumulative abnormal returns over a two-day event window (0, +1) 
where 0 is the acquisition announcement date using the market model. The 
estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the acquisition announcement. 
Market returns are based on the CRSP value-weighted index. 
3yABHR The bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily returns following the acquisition effective 
date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily returns of the matching firm for the same 
time period from CRSP. 
ΔIROA The difference between the acquirer’s return on assets (ROA) at the end of the 
second year following the effective date (t+2) minus the industry median for the 
same year and the acquirer’s ROA at the end of the year preceding the transaction (t-
1) minus the industry median for the same year from Compustat. 
Cross-Sectional Volatility Measures 
SD_3m_CARs The cross-sectional standard deviation of acquirers’ cumulative abnormal daily 
returns for a 3-month window (63 trading days) beginning one day after the 
acquisition announcement date. The variable is repeated over 6-month, 9-month and 
12-month windows following the announcement date. 
SD_3m_ABHRs The cross-sectional standard deviation of acquirers’ abnormal buy-and-hold daily 
returns for a 3-month period (63 trading days) beginning one day after the 
acquisition announcement date. The variable is repeated over 6-month, 9-month and 
12-month windows following the announcement date. 
51 
 
Deal Characteristics 
In-Wave A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition has been initiated 
during a merger wave and zero otherwise. Transactions are classified as in-wave or 
out-wave following the method developed by Harford (2005). 
In-Wave_Year A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the industry experiences a merger 
wave during the calendar year and zero otherwise. 
Acquisition A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has made an acquisition 
announcement in a given year and zero otherwise. 
Payment_Cash A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the transaction is financed only with 
cash and zero otherwise. 
Diversifying A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquiring firm and the target 
operate in different industries and zero otherwise based on the Fama and French 
(1997) classification of 48 industries. 
Public A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a publicly listed firm 
and zero otherwise. 
Private A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a privately held firm 
and zero otherwise. 
Relative_Size The ratio of the deal value reported in SDC Platinum to the market value of the 
acquiring firm 4 weeks before the acquisition announcement from CRSP. 
 
